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Purchasing’s Strategic Relevance 
 
Abstract: 
Recently Ramsay (2001) applied the resource based view of the firm (RBV) to argue 
that purchasing is a largely irrelevant activity from a strategic management point of 
view. In this paper it will be argued to the contrary on several grounds. First, it will 
be shown there is a much wider theoretical base underlying the field of strategic 
management, from which arguments can be drawn to substantiate that purchasing 
can indeed have strategic impact. Second, recent developments in the RBV will be 
discussed to illustrate that also within the RBV purchasing is a strategic activity. 
Furthermore there is much empirical evidence to demonstrate that purchasing and 
supply management activities contribute to sustainable competitive advantage. The 
paper then puts forward a systematic set of criteria, which may be of value to 
purchasing management researchers to assess whether studied phenomena have 
strategic impact. Finally some hints are given for future research directions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There appears to be an ongoing search for a separate identity for the field of 
purchasing management. Ramsay (2001) intends to contribute to this search by 
investigating whether purchasing can live up to the standards set by strategic 
management. Strategic management is the area of management studies concerned 
with decisions that help a firm obtain sustainable competitive advantage (SCA). SCA 
is said to occur when a firm implements a strategy that is “not simultaneously being 
implemented by any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are 
unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (Barney, 1991: 102, emphasis in 
original). The central question in this paper is whether purchasing management can 
help a firm build SCA. Ramsay uses the Resource-Based View of the firm (RBV) to 
investigate this question. He concludes (2001: 257) that “purchasing typically has no 
significant strategic role to play, and that the function‟s activities are operational in 
nature”.  
 In this paper Ramsay‟s view will be challenged on three main grounds. First, 
in section two, it will be shown there is a much wider theoretical base underlying the 
field of strategic management, from which arguments will be drawn to substantiate 
that purchasing can indeed have strategic impact. Then, in section three, recent 
developments in the RBV will be discussed to illustrate that also within the RBV 
purchasing is seen as a strategic activity. In section four empirical examples will be 
provided to help demonstrate that purchasing and supply management can contribute 
to competitive advantage according to the definitions set by the RBV. In section five 
this paper puts forward a systematic set of criteria for assessing whether phenomena 
in purchasing management have strategic impact. Section six concludes that 
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purchasing is a strategically relevant activity and provides some points of future 
research interest. 
 
 
2. The RBV within the field of strategy 
 
In this section the position of the RBV within strategy will be analysed. In particular 
it will be argued there are several alternative streams of strategic management 
literature that have something to say about the strategic potential of purchasing. The 
RBV has today arguably become the most dominant perspective for thinking about 
firm strategy. However, to fully appreciate resource-based thinking it should be 
placed within its historical context. The RBV was truly developed in the late 1980s 
as an antidote to the then dominant positioning school, coming out of industrial 
organisation and headed in particular by Porter (1980, 1985), which suggested a 
firm‟s competitive position can be analysed by looking at industry structure. On the 
basis of the characteristics of an industry, including the bargaining power of 
suppliers, the best firm strategy can be determined. The role of internal decision 
making was largely, if not fully, neglected by Porter (1980).  
This was not in line with the earlier strategic management tradition, which 
stressed both internal and external factors (Ansoff, 1965; Skinner, 1969) and 
therefore several scholars felt a different perspective would be appropriate and went 
on to develop the RBV. Some key papers include Barney (1991), Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993), and (Peteraf, 1993). The roots on which these authors build lie 
back further in time (Coase, 1937; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). While Coase‟s 
(1937) article is generally known for stipulating the role of transaction costs, it also 
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explicitly recognises that there can be and normally is heterogeneity of resources 
among different firms. This is an important departure from neo-classical economics 
and, as shall be demonstrated in a moment, a key building stone of the RBV. 
Penrose‟s (1959) contribution is particularly in recognising the importance of 
accumulation of resources within a firm and linking them to firm performance. 
Wernerfelt (1984), other than naming the RBV, proposed an analysis of firms by 
resources (inputs) rather than product-market categories (outputs). Wernerfelt (1984) 
suggested this approach might be most appropriate under the conditions of high 
dynamism that are so typical of many industries today. 
After that the RBV was further developed in an effort to stress the importance 
of managerial choice and internal factors in general. Hence the RBV, to put it in the 
words of its leading proponent Jay Barney (1991), „examines the link between a 
firm‟s internal characteristics and performance‟ by looking at heterogeneous 
resources within the firm. This makes the choice for applying the RBV to assess 
whether purchasing management has any strategic relevance (Ramsay, 2001) 
something of an odd one. Purchasing management is, by the nature of its activities, 
condemned to obtaining inputs from outside partners in the firm‟s environment. How 
can we judge activities that are mostly external in nature by applying a perspective 
that is primarily internal in nature? It appears that applying the RBV in its original 
form is almost a case of circular reasoning. Since we assume SCA derives from 
within the firm, we find that an activity performed between a firm and its external 
partners does not lead to SCA. This is a useless exercise unless one is willing to 
depart from the assumption that only internal resources can contribute to SCA. As 
the next section will discuss, by looking more closely at resource-based thinking and 
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applying its more recent extensions, it is more feasible to judge the strategic 
relevance of purchasing management. 
 
First, however, it is necessary to elaborate further on the limited scope of using only 
resource-based thinking to determine whether purchasing management is 
strategically relevant. Although the RBV is currently the most widely applied 
perspective for studying firm strategy, which is why it represents the field well, it is 
not the only perspective in the field of strategic management. In fact, a wide range of 
concepts and perspectives have been used in this field, among them population 
ecology, institutional theory, transaction cost economics, industrial organisation, 
knowledge-based thinking, resource dependence, dynamic capabilities, agency 
theory and the relational view.  
This raises an important question concerning the applicability of the RBV 
when judging the strategic relevance of purchasing management (Ramsay, 2001). 
How can we pick one out of many strategic management perspectives and then 
conclude that the field of strategic management as a whole has nothing positive to 
say about the rent-generating potential of purchasing? In fact, to support such a 
statement one would have to exhaustively apply all these various perspectives on 
which the field of strategic management rests, to then find that none of them amounts 
to the possibility that purchasing management can be a strategic activity. To make 
the counter-statement that purchasing management matters strategically, it suffices to 
find but one perspective in strategic management that has something positive to say 
about purchasing management. Two examples will now briefly be discussed. 
 Porter‟s (1980) positioning argument that specifies four generic strategies a 
firm can follow, is based particularly on the assessment of the well-known five 
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forces model. As suggested above Porter looks at external factors to determine a 
firm‟s strategy. The five forces Porter (1980) mentions are threat of new entrants, 
bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitute products or services, bargaining 
power of suppliers and rivalry among existing competitors. Interestingly, a minimum 
of three of those five forces involves the suppliers of a firm and therefore purchasing 
management.  
The bargaining power of suppliers is the most obvious force related to 
purchasing management. Firms may find ways to assemble more bargaining power 
vis-à-vis suppliers, for example by bundling purchases from multiple divisions. The 
threat of new entrants consists partly of new start-ups or diversification by other 
firms but another way to enter a market mentioned by Porter (1980) is downstream 
investment by suppliers. That is, suppliers that are not well managed by their 
customers can become competitors of a firm. Again, managing supplier relations thus 
is a strategically important activity for the firm. The same applies for the third force, 
threat of substitute products or services. It may actually be suppliers of the firm with 
their wealth of specific knowledge that innovate by producing a substitute for the 
firm‟s products. The management of relations with suppliers thus contributes directly 
to three of the five forces that determine industry profitability. Therefore it is 
impossible to conclude that purchasing has no strategic role to play on the basis of 
the work of Porter (1980). Of course in practice the degree to which purchasing is 
strategically relevant differs widely among industries, for example because of 
varying degrees of commoditisation of supplies (Porter, 1985). 
 
The relational view is a much more recent perspective developed in particular by 
Dyer and Singh (1998) as part of the growing literature on the importance of trust in 
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and relation building with other firms in order to obtain joint benefits. Its core 
statement is that relations with outside parties, such as suppliers, may help a firm 
develop „relational rent‟, superior performance due to idiosyncratic relations. Dyer 
and Singh (1998: 661) formulate it as follows: 
 
“Firms who combine resources in unique ways may realize an advantage 
over competing firms who are unable to do so. Thus, idiosyncratic 
interfirm linkage may be a source of relational rents and competitive 
advantage.” 
  
They then go on to describe four important mechanisms through which such 
advantages may be realised: joint investments, knowledge exchange, combining 
valuable and scarce resources, and more effective governance. One empirical 
example of obtaining such relational rents is the „Keiretsu‟ supplier network of 
Chrysler, as discussed by Dyer (1996). Dyer argues that Chrysler has been able to 
replicate some of the positive traits of Japanese supplier networks and that this 
provides the firm with a competitive advantage. Clearly the relational rent 
framework assigns a very strategic value to the management of outside partners and 
therefore contains an important role for purchasing management. 
 
 
3. Resource-based thinking revisited 
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The argument that has just been made suggests that an analysis of other approaches 
to firm strategy indeed amounts to strategic relevance for purchasing. Now it will be 
argued that the same is true for the RBV.  
 
3.1 Open markets versus quasi-integration 
Ramsay (2001: 258) is correct in noticing that the RBV has established that: 
 
“…firms cannot expect to purchase sustained competitive advantages on 
open markets. Rather such advantages must be found in the rare, 
imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable resources already controlled 
by a firm” (Barney, 1991: 117, emphasis added). 
 
This is a logical observation since the key trait of an open market is that every 
participant can purchase the same goods at the same price. It is difficult to obtain 
competitive advantage when all competitors can immediately replicate a firm‟s 
actions. Neo-classical economics even extends this premise further by suggesting 
that SCA is impossible altogether, whether it be through markets or through 
hierarchies. By introducing the assumption of heterogeneous resources, the RBV can 
claim that SCA is possible. If firms use a differing set of resources different 
competitive outcomes can occur. However, in two important counts Ramsay‟s (2001) 
interpretation of the RBV is faulty here. First, it is important to look at the definition 
of an open market and its occurrence in empirical reality. Second, it will be 
demonstrated that the RBV has never effectively ruled out obtaining SCA through 
outside partners, not even in its original programme, although it appeared there rather 
marginally. 
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 One of the key criticisms of Williamson‟s (1975) original markets and 
hierarchies programme, as well as of other streams of economics, is that it holds an 
inaccurate view of these markets and hierarchies. Granovetter (1985) argues that 
Williamson demonstrated an undersocialised view of markets while holding an 
oversocialised view of organisations. The first point is of most interest here. 
Granovetter suggests that in reality most markets will not reflect the atomistic 
structures Williamson (1975) ascribes to them. In fact, markets will rely on important 
social mechanisms for purposes of cohesion but also to facilitate information 
exchange. This is true even for the most atomistic kind of market we know of, the 
stock market. In stock markets signalling devices (Spence, 1974) that operate 
according to mutually agreed schemes are crucial for the functioning of the market. 
As the renowned economist Simon (1991) has argued, the current economic 
landscape consists mostly of organisations and transactions between them. Only to a 
very limited extent do we see the kinds of markets neo-classical economics 
presupposes. Hennart (1993) has added to this the idea that most transactions are a 
mix of modes and carry in them both elements of „marketness‟, through price 
controls on outputs, and „hierarchyness‟, through authority controls on inputs. Open 
markets, then, are rather exceptional.  
Once we apply this knowledge to the field of purchasing management, what 
do we see? Purchasing management deals with business-to-business markets, which 
often simultaneously are oligopsonies, with few buyers, and oligopolies, with few 
sellers. Therefore social structure tends to be even more important in business-to-
business or industrial markets, as parties know each other very well and there is a 
large „shadow of the future‟ (Axelrod, 1984). Opportunistic behaviour is at a 
minimum discouraged in such environments. Business-to-business markets do not 
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conform well to the idea of an open market. Thus the fact that SCA can not be 
obtained through purchasing in open markets, tells us nothing about the strategic 
relevance of purchasing. 
 
This discussion of the nature of markets has coincided with the development of an 
alternative to markets and hierarchies, namely interorganisational relations (IORs, 
see Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Mol, 2001; Ring and van de Ven, 1992). In 
Williamson‟s (1991) terms this is called quasi-integration or relational contracting. 
There is a widespread belief that such IORs are increasingly being used in practice 
and it is definitely true that research interest in them has grown disproportionately in 
recent years (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). One form of an IOR is the buyer-
supplier relation (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Ring and van de Ven, 1992). 
Therefore firms do not only purchase through open markets but also, and 
increasingly, through interorganisational relations with dedicated suppliers. In fact, 
as should be clear by now, almost all purchasing by firms will take on at least some 
of the elements of an interorganisational relation. The literature on 
interorganisational relations has provided a wealth of examples that buyer-supplier 
relations can lead to SCA, some of which will be discussed in section four. Ramsay‟s 
(2001) contention that purchasing can not lead to SCA because purchasing through 
open markets can not lead to SCA thus seems to be misinformed. 
 A second and related point is whether the RBV is in disagreement with the 
literature on IORs. At first sight the Barney (1991) quote cited above seems to 
suggest so. However, in his text Barney does not suggest there is nothing beyond 
these open markets. To the contrary in fact, on the condition of social complexity, 
which is one route to SCA, he states elsewhere that (1991: 110, emphasis added): 
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“A wide variety of firm resources may be socially complex. Examples 
include the interpersonal relations among managers in a firm, … a firm‟s 
culture, … a firm’s reputation among suppliers”. 
 
This sheds quite a different light on the work of Barney than what is suggested by 
Ramsay (2001). Barney appears to think that IORs, established outside of the realm 
of either the open market or the firm, may indeed be a source of SCA through a 
superior reputation among suppliers. Note that the example of reputation is only one 
manifestation of how SCA through purchasing may come about.  
Further evidence is found in the emphasised part of the earlier quote. Barney 
does not say that a firm needs to own resources in order to exploit them. He indicates 
a firm must control them. In order to control resources it is not necessary to own 
them. A long-term relation with a supplier may also deliver effective control of 
resources, particularly when guarantees and mutual commitment are built in. It must 
be concluded then that the RBV in its original form is not in disagreement with the 
IOR literature and has even embraced the possibility of obtaining SCA through 
outside relations, although it tends to see these relations as an internal resource. 
 
3.2 Transitory core competence view 
There are two widely different interpretations of the core competence argument, one 
of which goes unmentioned by Ramsay (2001), when he discusses the performance 
impact of the make-or-buy decision. On the one hand there are those (e.g. Quinn, 
1999) who argue that any activity that is not based on a core competence ought to be 
outsourced, as Ramsay (2001) correctly notes. Quinn (1999) argues that firms are 
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unlikely to excel in a wide range of activities and therefore should outsource all 
activities in which they are not „best-in-world‟ to a best-in-world outside supplier. 
On the other hand there is the view that looks not only at the activities that are 
based on a core competence, but also on activities that are (closely) related to these 
activities as potentially strategic activities that ought to be performed in-house. This 
has been referred to as the transitory core competence view (Kotabe, 1998). D‟Aveni 
and Ravenscraft (1994) argue and provide evidence that a firm can benefit from 
economies of scope by performing activities in-house even if not all of these 
activities are based on a core competence. Kotabe (1998) has pointed at the 
importance of the interfaces between the marketing, R & D and production functions 
when making a make-or-buy decision. Kotabe suggests that firms add value precisely 
at these intersections.  
This makes both the outsourcing decision more complicated and arguably far 
more strategic than acknowledged by Ramsay (2001), and provides a perspective 
whereby activities that are related to core competences, though not based on them, 
may be sourced internally or externally. The latter point shows that activities that are 
supplied by external partners may be of a strategic nature despite not being core to a 
firm
1
.  
 
3.3 Recent extensions to the RBV  
Since the RBV was originally positioned as an internal approach to studying SCA, as 
described above, one natural criticism was that it was not enough concerned with the 
context in which the firm operates (Oliver, 1997). In this spirit several extensions 
were made to resource-based thinking in recent years. For example Oliver (1997: 
707) states that: 
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“Alliances allow firms to tap into time compression diseconomies and 
history-dependent competencies that are difficult to trade in strategic 
factor markets.”  
 
Oliver suggests that alliances are an important form of social capital and resources in 
themselves. This has implications for the strategic value of these alliances, among 
them buyer-supplier partnerships. Similarly Barney (1999) has explicitly 
acknowledged that important capabilities are often obtained from outside parties 
through what he labels „intermediate governance‟. He further specifies this by stating 
the conditions under which this is particularly useful (1999: 143): 
 
“Under conditions of high uncertainty, firms prefer to gain access to 
another firm‟s capabilities through strategic alliances….rather than 
through acquisitions.” 
 
In later work Barney once again stresses the importance of relations to outside parties 
like suppliers when he discusses current resource-based thinking (2000: 263): 
 
“….[S]ocial structure, both within an organization and outside an 
organization, has a significant impact on an organization‟s form and on 
its ability to accomplish its goals”. 
 
In recent work of Quinn (1999), who is concerned far less with theory than Barney, a 
similar trend is visible. Quinn (1999) says that links to outside knowledge sources 
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that are able to assemble diverse expertise greatly affect the timing and amplitude of 
innovations. He further adds that sophisticated outsourcing supported by new 
electronic communications, modelling, and monitoring techniques enables 
companies to reduce innovation cycle times and costs by 60 percent to 90 percent 
and decrease investments and risks by equal amounts. Quinn also suggests that top 
management ought to get involved in such outsourcing decisions given their 
importance. This effectively implies that purchasing decisions enter the board room, 
yet another sign of the strategic importance of these decisions. It can be concluded 
that recent additions to the RBV, both conceptually and practically, have stressed the 
importance of managing relations with outside parties, like suppliers, for obtaining 
SCA. Again, this is an indication of the strategic importance of purchasing 
management activities. 
 
 
4. Empirical support 
 
Providing theoretical support for the link between purchasing and SCA is an 
important first step. This step, however, is rather meaningless if subsequent empirical 
tests fail to support it. There are several empirical problems attached to the statement 
that purchasing is strategically irrelevant. One issue neglected by Ramsay (2001) is 
the difference between a purchasing department and the purchasing function. It is 
increasingly recognised that purchasing management as a function encompasses a 
much wider range of activities than the mere ordering of pencils (Monczka, Trent, 
and Handfield, 1998). A purchasing department, an organisational unit that is, may 
indeed mostly be involved with such relatively simple activities to the extent that this 
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unit could under certain circumstances even be outsourced. The key question, then, is 
whether assessing the strategic potential of purchasing management requires an 
assessment of the strategic nature of the activities undertaken by a purchasing 
department or an assessment of the activities that are normally included in the 
definition of the purchasing function.  
The answer to this question is perhaps best provided by a brief look at 
research in the field of purchasing management. For this, one can turn to current 
output in the field. Other than Ramsay (2001), 22 articles appeared in the European 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management in 2001 of which 6 were concerned 
with relations with suppliers. Another 5 investigated the impact of sourcing or make-
or-buy decisions on an organisation and its goals. Some 9 articles looked at tools and 
systems of purchasing like IT and lean supply. And 2 articles were of a more general, 
conceptual nature. This means that at least half of the articles were related to topics 
that can have a strategic impact on firms. Of course there are all kinds of limitations 
to such a casual look at a field that stretches beyond Europe, beyond a single journal 
and beyond a single year. Other research topics and approaches might for instance 
dominate in other areas of the world. Bearing in mind those limitations, it still seems 
fair to say that purchasing management nowadays involves far more than studying 
people ordering goods. 
But is there empirical evidence that these issues are related to SCA of the 
firm? There is in fact plenty of evidence. A meta study on financial performance by 
Capon, Farley and Hoenig (1990) clearly demonstrated that the make-or-buy 
decision, where firms choose whether to outsource or to vertically integrate, had 
significant impact on the financial performance of firms in almost all studies 
included. More recent evidence includes Murray, Kotabe and Wildt (1995). For 
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buyer-supplier relations there have been similar contentions, for example by Gulati 
(1995), Lane and Bachmann (1996), and Ford (1998). Thus it seems that the field of 
purchasing management has responded well to the changes in managerial practice by 
increasingly including strategically relevant activities like supplier management and 
sourcing strategy in its research agenda.  
 
 
5. Assessing the strategic importance of purchasing activities 
 
Given that purchasing has substantial strategic relevance, how can the impact be 
analysed in purchasing management research? Several criteria emerge based on the 
previous discussion. 
 
5.1 Measurement of performance 
Having a competitive advantage implies that a firm outperforms its competitors. 
Empirically proving this point requires the registration of an appropriate performance 
measure. This raises the issue what makes a performance measure appropriate apart 
from the fact that it must be quantified. In strategic management research most 
measures of performance are firm level constructs. However, in the context of 
purchasing research one might also think about intermediate measures like reliability 
of deliveries. The drawback of such measures is that they are often highly firm 
specific.  
This brings up an important requirement: a performance measure used to 
assess one firm must be comparable to that used to assess its competitor. This means 
very firm specific measures are not useful in this respect. As we wish to compare the 
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performance of one firm to that of its competitors it is also necessary to measure the 
performance of its competitors. Furthermore, since a measure has to be replicated 
across time it should also not be time specific. As the reliability of deliveries may 
increase over time among all companies, it is difficult to compare this year‟s delivery 
performance with last year‟s delivery performance unless some mechanism exists to 
make performance comparable over these years. In general then, performance 
measures must be quantifiable, comparable across firms and comparable across time 
to be useful for measuring SCA. 
 
5.2 Establishing a causal relation 
A next important step is to establish a causal relation between the dependent (a 
certain purchasing strategy) and independent (performance) variables. First, and this 
is obvious, it should established that a relation between two variables does indeed 
exist. To do so requires a clear understanding of what variables will be related to 
each other, which is usually best achieved in the form of a hypothesis. Once the 
relation has been established its causality comes into question. Causality can be 
found on the basis of theory (deduction) and / or ex post empirical assessment 
(induction). For a deductive assessment a logical and coherent theory connecting 
purchasing strategy and performance is needed. For an inductive assessment either a 
qualitative research method could be used, or a quantitative longitudinal study that 
shows that performance changes follow the introduction of a new purchasing strategy 
and not the other way around. 
 
5.3 Determining the possibility of SCA 
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As noted earlier the issue of sustainability of competitive advantage has best been 
captured by Barney (1991). He argues that to gain SCA firms must have 
implemented a value creating strategy that is not simultaneously implemented by 
competitors. In Barney‟s (1991) view such sustainability can arise given the 
existence of all of the following conditions: 
 Resources are valuable 
 Resources are rare 
 Resources are imperfectly imitable because they are history dependent or 
causally ambiguous or socially complex or a combination thereof 
 Resources are not substitutable 
In purchasing management many examples arise of these conditions. For example, 
valuable resources may include a highly reputable or knowledgeable purchasing 
manager that suppliers are more eager to work with or more willing to deal with. 
Rare resources can include an exclusive relation with a best-in-world supplier of a 
strategic input to the firm‟s key product. Imperfectly imitable resources can involve a 
wide range of resources. One example would be a decision several years ago to keep 
production of a good in-house whereas competitors outsourced production, when that 
good now turns out to be the basis of a key innovation that revolutionises an 
industry. In this case a firm possessed foresight that its competitors did not have, 
meaning both path dependence and causal ambiguity are present. Finally, non-
substitutability of resources implies that the strategic value of a resource is not 
similar to that of another resource controlled by competitors. That is, if a firm has a 
superior purchasing staff, competitors must not be able to equal that advantage by 
outsourcing their purchasing function altogether.  
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What would be needed when researching the strategic value of (parts of) the 
purchasing function is an assessment of the extent to which these conditions apply in 
the specific area being researched. For instance, somebody doing research on 
supplier relations in the Brazilian manufacturing industry, should be concerned with 
the extent to which buyer-supplier relations in this context are socially complex, can 
deliver superior value etc. If these conditions exist to some extent, then SCA can be 
obtained. One other thing to keep in mind is the problem of „luck‟ in strategy 
research (Barney, 1986; Stinchcombe, 2000). Any firm is due to encounter runs of 
good and bad luck and it is very difficult to distinguish between good luck and a 
good strategy in a given case (Stinchcombe, 2000). A longitudinal perspective may 
be required to do that. That is, it must be shown that firms with a particular, 
idiosyncratic strategy outperform their competitors not just at one point in time but 
consistently. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The field of strategic management has enough positive things to say about the 
strategic potential of purchasing to conclude that purchasing is strategically relevant. 
In fact, purchasing can even be said to have become more relevant in recent years as 
firms have outsourced more activities and look towards their external suppliers to 
create added value. This indicates strategic advantage not only resides within the 
firm but also between the firm and its partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998). To their 
merit, scholars in the resource-based view of the firm have increasingly recognised 
this in recent years.  
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Purchasing management research seems to have done well by picking up the 
overall point that purchasing matters to competitive advantage. In doing so it would 
benefit by incorporating a list of criteria that must be met for a purchasing activity to 
be strategically relevant. In this paper, such a list is proposed.  
Another point of interest for future research is the nature of theory formation 
in purchasing management. It can be observed that purchasing management 
textbooks (e.g. Monczka, Trent, and Handfield, 1998), which are representative of 
the field, put up a wide variety of frameworks that are very easy to apply for 
managers. Arguably, the same can be said for most of the scholarly articles in the 
field. However, these frameworks are best seen as managerial heuristics rather than 
theories describing the way in which purchasing management helps a firm obtain 
sustainable competitive advantage. To date there appears to be too great a need 
among purchasing management researchers to come up with their own frameworks 
of what the world looks like. This leads to both fragmentation of the field and a lack 
of theoretical rigour. It appears that this is one pressing issue researchers in the field 
of purchasing management need to tackle if they wish to go into the research 
direction captured by the question „how do firms obtain SCA‟.  
Wider borrowing of theories stemming from strategic management and 
organisation theory could be one solution for purchasing management research. 
When researching the strategic impact of purchasing it appears sensible to draw from 
specialists in strategic management as they have studied the strategic impact of a 
wide range of firm decisions. Formulating testable hypotheses based upon such 
theories would be an important step forward in this respect. Implementing such 
changes will benefit researchers in the field of purchasing management and will in 
fact increase the relevance of their research for managerial audiences. 
 21 
 
 
 22 
References 
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H., 1993. Strategic assets and organizational rent. 
Strategic Management Journal 14(1), 33-46. 
Ansoff, H.I. 1965. Corporate Strategy. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Axelrod, R. M., 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York. 
Barney, J. B., 1986. Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business 
strategy. Management Science 32(10), 99-120. 
Barney, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management 17(1), 99-120. 
Barney, J. B., 1999. How a firm's capabilities affect boundary decisions. Sloan 
Management Review 40(3), 137-145. 
Barney, J.B. 2000. Context is crucial: Commonalities, differences, and subtle 
differences. In: Baum, J.A.C., F. Dobbin (Eds.), Economics meets Sociology in 
Strategic Management. JAI Press, Stamford, pp. 261-269. 
Barringer, B. R., & Harrison, J. S., 2000. Walking a tightrope: Creating value 
through interorganizational relationships. Journal of Management 26(3), 367-403. 
Capon, N., Farley, J. U., & Hoenig, S., 1990. Determinants of financial performance: 
A meta-analysis. Management Science 36(10), 1143-1160. 
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 386-405. 
D‟Aveni, R. A., & Ravenscraft, D. J., 1994. Economies of integration versus 
bureaucracy costs: Does vertical integration improve performance? Academy of 
Management Journal 37(5), 1167-1206. 
Dyer, J. H., 1996. How Chrysler created an American Keiretsu. Harvard Business 
Review (July-August), 42-56. 
 23 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H., 1998. The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources 
of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review 
23(4), 660-679. 
Ford, D., 1998. Managing Business Relationships. Wiley, Chichester. 
Granovetter, M., 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91(3), 481-510. 
Gulati, R., 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for 
contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal 38(1), 85-112. 
Robert M. Monczka, Robert Trent, Robert Handfield, 1998. Purchasing and supply 
chain management. South-Western College, Cincinatti. 
Hennart, J.-F., 1993. Explaining the swollen middle: Why most transactions are a 
mix of 'market' and hierarchy'. Organization Science 4(4), 529-547. 
Kotabe, M., 1998. Efficiency vs. effectiveness orientation of global sourcing 
strategy: A comparison of U.S. and Japanese multinational companies. Academy of 
Management Executive 12(4), 107-119. 
Lane, C., & Bachmann, R., 1996. The social constitution of trust: Supplier relations 
in Britain and Germany. Organization Studies 17(3), 365-395. 
Mol, M. J., 2001. Creating value through working with others: Interorganizational 
relations. Academy of Management Executive 15(1), 150-152. 
Murray, J. Y., Kotabe, M., & Wildt, A. R., 1995. Strategic and financial implications 
of global sourcing strategy: A contingency analysis. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 26(1) 181-202. 
Oliver, C., 1997. Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and 
resource-based views. Strategic Management Journal 18(9), 697-713. 
 24 
Penrose, E. (1959). The Theory of Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Peteraf, M. A., 1993. The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based 
view. Strategic Management Journal 14(3), 179-191. 
Porter, M. E., 1980. Competitive Strategy. Free Press, New York. 
Porter, M. E., 1985. Competitive Advantage. Free Press, New York. 
Quinn, J. B., 1999. Strategic outsourcing: Leveraging knowledge capabilities. Sloan 
Management Review 40(3), 9-21. 
Ramsay, J., 2001. Purchasing's strategic irrelevance. European Journal of Purchasing 
and Supply Management 7(4), 257-263. 
Ring, P. S., & Van De Ven, A. H., 1992. Structuring cooperative relationships 
between organizations. Strategic Management Journal 13, 483-498. 
Simon, H. A., 1991. Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
5(2), 25-44. 
Skinner, W. (1969) Manufacturing – missing link in corporate strategy. Harvard 
Business Review May-Jun, 136-145. 
Spence, A.M. 1974. Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related 
Screening Processes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Stinchcombe, A.L. 2000. On equilibrium, organizational form, and competitive 
strategy. In: Baum, J.A.C., F. Dobbin (Eds.), Economics meets Sociology in 
Strategic Management. JAI Press, Stamford, pp. 261-269. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 5(2), 171-180. 
Williamson, O. E., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. Free Press, New York. 
 25 
Williamson, O. E., 1991. Strategizing, economizing and economic organization. 
Strategic Management Journal 12(Winter Special Issue), 75-94. 
 
 
Footnotes 
                                                          
1
 There is one more problem to the view Quinn (1999) holds on make-or-buy decisions, although this 
is only weakly related to the current discussion. It is generally believed firms can have only one or a 
few core competencies. Outsourcing all other activities to a best-in-world party would leave a firm 
with very few activities indeed, which might best be called hollow. It is questionable any firms should 
and would really want to go that far. 
 
